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Postcolonialism, like its kindred spirit post-
modernism, is born into and reared in a 
paradox: it is at once an offshoot of cultur-
al developments in the modern West and 
a critical engagement with these develop-
ments. The postcolonial critique of the for-
mation of the modern historical discipline is
a notable example. As postmodernism in-
troduces a forceful epistemological shake-
up of the foundation of modern historiog-
raphy – its use and reliance of language to 
reconstruct historical reality – postcoloni-
alism challenges ferociously its focal point
around which the work of modern histo-
rians (since the nineteenth century, if not 
earlier) has centred: the writing of national
history and the discipline of historical study 
in general. Yet given the paradigmatic in-
fluence of national history-writing around
the world, the postcolonial critique of mod-
ern historiography has also, perhaps par-
adoxically, benefited from the worldwide
formation of academic disciplines in mod-
ern times after the western model. Indeed, 
scholars have already noted that many
leading figures of postcolonialism often not 
only received substantial training in west-
ern scholarship but also excelled in their 
respective area of study, by which they ob-
tained opportunities to launch and establish
their careers in the western academes. The 
examples of Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty and Edward Said, the 
leading advocate and patron of postcolo-
nialism, are all too well known to require
more belabouring.1 That these scholars 
have been steeped in the western scholar-
ly tradition has exerted a positive influence 
on their career development: compared
to most of their colleagues in the western
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academia, they are able to cruise freely between cultural traditions, which helps at times yield
a new perspective and, more significantly, a critical edge. The fact that postcolonialism has re-
ceived such ample attention in the academic worlds across the globe speaks volumes of this
cross-cultural effect. The efficacy of postcolonial critique of the modern West, or western mo-
dernity, seems to have derived in the main from the fact that the scholars are at once “insiders” 
and “outsiders” and are able to present both the emic and etic viewpoints. Notwithstanding their 
cross-cultural perspicacity, postcolonial scholars, it seems to me, also run into a theoretical 
paradox in their seemingly gallant endeavour to confront and challenge western hegemony in
the academe. This paradox is most apparent in the postcolonial criticism of modern historiog-
raphy, especially in rejecting the prevalence of national history-writing in modern times. In the 
following pages, I shall present my argument by discussing the origins of the Subaltern Studies 
in India, a landmark development in postcolonial theory and study, from a different angle. It will 
be followed by an observation that though nationalist historiography is currently under siege in 
western academies, it retains its persistent influence and palpable relevance in today’s seem-
ingly “postnationalist” world, especially in parts of Asia. I shall then end my article with a more 
detailed explanation of how the postcolonial rejection of nationalist historiography has turned 
around to have weakened its resistance to western cultural hegemony, a key area where post-
colonialism claims its importance and exerts its influence across worldwide academe. I shall 
illustrate my discussions and present my argument by using examples mostly from Chinese
history and historiography.2
It has been relatively well noted that in its challenge to the established academic discourses
around the world, which derived from the Enlightenment tradition in eighteenth-century Europe, 
postcolonialism has benefited from its alliance with postmodernism. Postmodernism and post-
colonialism seem to share one commonality, which is the notion that knowledge is not only pow-
er, but also that power produces knowledge and helps its spread and dominance. Postcolonial 
scholars have produced a number of insightful works that reveal how western political and mili-
tary dominance, from the eighteenth century onwards, came to aid the establishment of modern 
western cultural hegemony. It became a cultural norm against which other cultures are evalu-
ated, often critically, and diagnosed for their inability to embrace the modern world. Particularly,
it was argued that in contrast to the West, most nonwestern cultures lack a historical conscious-
ness or historical mindedness. This historical consciousness was critical to the idea of national-
ism and the building of modern nation-states as shown in Europe from the seventeenth centu-
ry. It also helped elucidate the process of nation-building as a logical historical development and 
present it as the prevalent form of political government for and in the modern world.3 To claim
that historical consciousness is unique in European culture is, of course, a biased observation, 
for a sense of history is found among many cultures in the world, even though its manifestation 
might have taken different forms.4 It is legitimate, therefore, for postcolonial scholars, along with 
postmodern thinkers, to argue that historical practices of modern times, centring on the writing of 
national history, extended and justified the western dominance of the world because it originated 
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from and was modelled on European historical and cultural experiences. Postcolonial critics have 
also rightly observed that the emphasis on the rise of nation-states in historical writing favours 
an essentialist configuration of a national past and that the way in which historical (re)presenta-
tion generally takes a written form reflects a cultural bias for the West.5
But should we disregard the value of historical study and overlook the persistent influence of
nation-states in our lives? Or, to put it figuratively, should we throw out the baby along with the 
bathwater? My answer is no, which, I would argue, is a position that would be shared by the In-
dian scholars who pioneered the Subaltern Studies in the 1960s and 1970s which gave rise to
postcolonial theory in more recent decades.
Marxism and postcolonialism
With respect to the emergence of the Subaltern Studies collective, many have credited, for the
right reason, the western education and cultural influence (for example, poststructuralism and 
postmodernism) most of its members have received that subsequently shaped their early ca-
reer.6 Little, however, is known or pronounced (professed?) that the Subaltern Studies, in its 
formative stage, was an integral part of the leftwing and socialist movement, tinged with a dis-
cernible nationalist sentiment, in the third world during the post-Second World War period. In
particular, I would emphasise the influence of Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the Chinese commu-
nist leader, who founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949 by mobilising poor peasants and 
turning them into the vanguard of the communist movement in the country. On many occasions
throughout his career, Mao shared his revolutionary views of history, emphasising such points 
as that “people are the motive force in history”, which were propagated through the dissemina-
tion of his many works, especially the famous “Little Red Book” (Quotations of Chairman Mao
Zedong) around the world during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). As China’s neighbour, India 
became one of the notable places where Maoism exerted a visible influence among its intel-
lectuals and on college campuses. Perhaps more than other peoples in the world at the time,
Indian scholars and students kept a watchful eye on the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution in 
China.7 Among college students, there emerged various factions and organisations that mod-
elled themselves on their counterparts in China, or the much-famed Red Guards who, consisting 
mostly of college and high-school students, were among the most enthusiastic in responding to 
Mao’s ideas. It is worth noting that the late 1960s, when the Cultural Revolution was in full swing 
in China, was also the period when most early Subaltern scholars began their college life in In-
dia. Ranajit Guha could be an exception, for he is apparently older than David Arnold and Partha 
Chatterjee and the rest of the members of the collective. But as a fellow Marxist and an erstwhile 
Communist Party member in India, it is without doubt that Guha was interested in and receptive
to Mao Zedong’s writings. In Guha’s introduction to Selected Subaltern Studies (1988), which he 
coedited with Gayatri Spivak and which came with a foreword by Edward Said, he quotes with 
ease some of Mao’s remarks, suggesting his familiarity with Mao’s work.8 That the Subaltern
Studies owed a certain debt to Mao Zedong has been noted by Prasenjit Duara, a China scholar 
from India, thanks to his knowledge of modern Chinese history and historiography.9
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It is not surprising that Indian intellectuals could be intrigued by Mao’s works and the Chinese
communist movement in general, for both countries shared a notable similarity with regard to 
their historical development in modern times. For instance, they both established their current
forms of government in the late 1940s – India in 1947 and China in 1949, which was marked by 
Mao’s victory over his nationalist adversaries, who had ended China’s imperial system in 1912. 
Prior to independence, India had been ruled as the jewel in the British colonial empire for about 
three centuries, whereas China had maintained its nominal independence under the faltering
Qing dynasty (1644–1912) and the fledgling republic (1912–) whose government, after being de-
feated by the communists, retreated to Taiwan in 1949. After gaining independence, Indian na-
tionalists did not suffer a major defeat like their Chinese counterparts at the hands of the com-
munists. Yet in light of the rising social instability and glaring rich–poor disparity in postinde-
pendence India, questions arose with respect to the efficacy of their rule and the legitimacy of
their government in serving the Indian people of all social walks. One of the major issues that 
motivated the Subaltern Studies collective in its formative stage was exactly how and whether 
the nationalist movement, or the national elite, in India could represent “India” and establish a ho-
listic and overarching nation-state following the western model in the subcontinent, well known 
for its cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity and social class/caste difference and stratifica-
tion. A glance of the major works published in the Subaltern Studies series suggests that Guha 
and his comrades focused their studies on two areas: first, the role the suppressed, voiceless
subaltern group, consisting mostly of peasants, had played in the struggles against the British
Raj that was either overlooked or looked down on by the national elite and nationalist histori-
ans; and second, how to amend and rectify the elite-oriented national history-writing prevalent
both before and after India’s independence by according proper attention and giving due credit
to the actions of the Subaltern group – which were driven by various factors other than nation-
alist sentiment yet nevertheless exerted an indelible imprint – in the course of change in mod-
ern India. The latter eventually led these scholars to question the usefulness and relevance of
national history-writing in India as well as in other nonwestern countries, and expose the prob-
lems in establishing a modern nation-state following the Enlightenment notion of a progressive 
modernity and its universal appeal.10 That is, Subaltern scholars strive to search for an alterna-
tive history, or an alternative way of writing history, to the paradigm of national history-writing
prevalent in the modern world.
These two foci shown in the works of Subaltern scholars ran a notable parallel to the primary 
concerns that animated the historical discussions and debates among Chinese Marxist histo-
rians from the 1940s through much of the 1960s. In fact, compared with the Subaltern group, 
Chinese Marxists had even a stronger motivation to explore the limits and faults of nationalist 
historiography because it was regarded as antithetical to their practice and advance of Marx-
ist historiography. They charged that, in contrast to the people’s approach advanced by Marxist 
historians, nationalist historiography was elitist and hence failed to represent divergent social 
groups in its call for social change and progress. In particular, Chinese Marxist historians em-
phasised, nationalist historians overlooked and slighted the remarkable role Chinese peasants 
and their uprisings had played in changing Chinese society for the better over China’s long feudal 
period. They regarded it as an urgent task to ensure that in their historical works, the masses, 
instead of the elites, receive focal attention. The study of Chinese peasant wars and rebellions
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thus coincided with Mao’s communist revolution in which the peasants not only participated but 
also played a heroic role. It attracted attention from Chinese Marxist historians because it ena-
bled them to draw useful lessons as well as insightful analogies between past peasant wars and 
the one led by the communists. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, after the communists took 
power in mainland China, the study of peasant wars or uprisings flourished, commanding great 
attention among historians across political persuasions and educational backgrounds. It became 
one of the “five golden flowers” in the field of history of the age. Given its direct relevance to the 
success of the Chinese communist revolution, the study of peasant wars was also undoubtedly
the most popular among the five.11
If the Chinese study of peasants and their rebellions is anterior to and possibly also inspiring
for the Subaltern Studies collective (after all, both countries’ economies, before the 1990s, were 
agriculturally based and have a significant peasant population, demanding the historian’s atten-
tion), Chinese Marxist historians also seemed to have faced a similar methodological and the-
oretical challenge to the one that later confronted the Subaltern scholars in their effort to give
voice to the silent subaltern by reading and interpreting “the prose of counter-insurgency”.12 As 
Chinese Marxist historians strove to figure peasants and peasant wars centrally in their histori-
cal writing, not only did they have to comb through the existing body of historical literature for 
any traces of potentially useful records, which was a mammoth task given its incredible size, but
they also needed to develop an ingenious technique in reading and interpreting these records, 
for few of them could be used directly to portray peasants as “revolutionary” and their wars as 
“heroic and progressive” as intended by Marxist historians. To accomplish the first task, Chinese 
historians compiled several volumes of historical sources pertaining to peasant rebellions from 
different historical periods, which became indispensable to their research. They also spent con-
siderable time and energy on discussing the techniques of reading and interpreting those sourc-
es in order to gain a good understanding of how peasant rebellions became a driving force for 
historical change. In other words, like the Subaltern scholars, Chinese Marxists were also per-
plexed by the question later posed acutely by Gayatri Spivak: “Can the subaltern speak?” Namely,
they had to tackle a similar task of how to give voice to the peasants if they hoped to correctly 
portray their conditions as causes for their uprisings and properly interpret the historical signifi-
cance of their violent and rebellious behaviour.13
In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that the interest and concern of Chinese Marxist historians in 
studying Chinese peasants and peasant wars paralleled and overlapped with that of the Subal-
tern Studies collective. Both groups started as Marxists (the Chinese were much more insistent 
than their Indian counterparts for an obvious reason), only to find that in their study of peasants,
they had to “capture the difference”, put eloquently by Prasenjit Duara, “between the orthodox
Marxism of mature capitalist societies and the conditions of colonial society where the subject 
of history was not the fledgling working class of the modern industrial sector, but the vast ma-
jority and variety of the oppressed or subaltern classes”.14 In the Chinese case, it is quite obvious
that, although the peasants represented unmistakably the “proletarian class” in imperial China, 
their behaviour and actions were markedly different from that of the working class in industrial
societies described and analysed by Marx in his works. Consequently, how to properly interpret 
the historical meaning of those past peasant rebellions and make a plausible connection with
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the peasant participation in the communist revolution became a critical as well as a knotty issue. 
Though similarly interested in peasants, Subaltern Studies has focused more on their condi-
tions and actions in a recent period, or before and after India’s political independence from Brit-
ish colonial rule. This difference gave rise to the collective’s critical examination of the national-
ist movement and nationalist ideology in India, which has broad implications that resonated well 
across the world. It became a key component in the postcolonial critique of the received notion 
of modernity and its paradigmatic influence in today’s world. Compared with the Chinese Marx-
ists, the Subaltern scholars identified this essentialism more clearly as a main reason account-
ing for the nationalist leaders’ indifference to the needs and interests of the subalterns. Yet the 
scholars in both China and India charged that nationalist leaders overlooked the importance of
mobilising the peasants in promoting social change, which subsequently caused social unrest 
and political instability. In fact, many of the problems that confronted India after its independ-
ence, discussed and analysed by the Subaltern scholars, were also observable in Republican
China during the first half of the nineteenth century, after the nationalists effectively put an end 
to the country’s long dynastic rule. The difference was that unlike India, where the nationalists
have more or less maintained their political power to this day, the government in China changed 
hands in 1949 when communists chased the nationalists from the mainland to Taiwan. As the 
task of rebuilding China under the communists became a priority, it entailed that the new govern-
ment develop new strategies to work with the peasants, hence the study of peasant rebellions
by historians. In other words, as Indian scholars set out to prove that the essentialist and elitist 
approach embedded in the nationalist ideology was inadequate and deeply flawed in solving the 
problems of postindependence India, this inadequacy had already proven fatal to the national-
ist cause in China, causing its loss of power on the mainland. Modern Chinese and Indian intel-
lectuals, therefore, tackled a different challenge in postwar years, for the two countries’ history 
followed a different trajectory.
Yet in both India and China, as the two countries entered the modern age, historians seemed to 
share a common experience in experimenting with the writing of national history because the 
genre was most helpful for them in reorganising and reinventing their traditions. Buoyed by the 
nationalist sentiment, they showed great pride in their rich, though also increasingly quaint, cul-
tural legacy and hoped that by adopting the writing of national history, they could renew and re-
vive it, providing a foundation on which a new nation could be built. In other words, while adopt-
ing the genre of writing national history, nationalist historians of nonwestern regions showed
no intention of uprooting or displacing completely native culture while embracing and instating 
modernity. Instead, they made a tremendous effort to preserve the native and the traditional as 
much as they could, even though, on first glance, their endeavour appeared iconoclastic.
That is, once historians in nonwestern regions such as China and India saw that nationalism pro-
vided a useful and powerful weapon for their country to shore up its strength and fend off the in-
cursion of foreign powers, they became very enthusiastic and deeply committed. In the case of 
China, the first generation of modern historians was, arguably, nationalist. They were attracted 
to the genre of national history, hailing it as a “real” form of historical writing (a similar observa-
tion was also made by early Indian nationalist historians). Some Chinese nationalist historians, 
such as Liang Qichao (1879–1927), went as far as to proclaim that although China had a long tra-
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dition of historical writing, what it had produced were mostly dregs because it failed to enhance 
national pride and adumbrate national evolution. Other historians stated emphatically that if if
there was no (national) history, then there could be no China (as a nation). But when they set out 
to write national histories of China, these historians became heavily reliant on the Chinese his-
toriographical tradition. When writing his famous Zhongguo lishi yanjiufa (Methods for the study 
of Chinese history), the same Liang Qichao, for instance, presented many examples from the 
Chinese historiographical tradition to explicate that in the area of historical methodology Chinese
historians in the past had developed sophisticated and scientific techniques comparable to those 
advanced by modern western historians. Hu Shi (1891–1962), another well-known “iconoclast”
with a PhD from Columbia University, was instrumental in introducing the philosophy of John 
Dewey (1859–1952), his Columbia mentor, into China. He believed that Dewey’s work on modern
western science and scientific method crystallised its spirit. But Hu also maintained that, with 
respect to the development of scientific method, Chinese scholars of the past were not so far be-
hind their western counterparts, even if their research goals and foci were apparently different.
During the 1920s and 1930s, Hu Shi played a leadership role in launching the “National Studies” 
movement, whose aim was to “reorganize the past and recreate (Chinese) civilization”.15 This
goal was readily identifiable in many nationalist projects launched similarly in other parts of the 
world – including India – around the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
National history: its position and persistence
The goal defined by Hu Shi for the “National Studies” movement – to “reorganize the past and 
recreate civilization” – not only outlines the main interest pursued by Chinese nationalist histo-
rians, it also characterises the endeavour by nonwestern historians to adopt the genre of na-
tional history generally. That is, in order to recreate civilisation, or to bring it up to date so that it 
could keep pace with the more advanced countries, they must “reorganize the past”, which en-
tailed that they reconfigure their knowledge of the past, if not the knowledge system in toto. This 
could be and has been at times a distressing process because it could possibly lead to cultural 
displacement, causing people to abandon the familiar and the traditional in order to embrace
and instate the new and the foreign. In the case of historical writings in India, it meant that the
Indians had to learn about their country’s history by reading historical texts authored mostly by 
European scholars, for both the concepts of nation (or the idea of “India” as a nation-state with 
clearly drawn borders) and of national history (tracing this India’s past by describing various po-
litical powers that once ruled the land in various historical times) were then unfamiliar and for-
eign to the Indians.16
The Chinese experience with the intrusion of modern western historiography fared no better.
Over the course of the twentieth century, there were incessant debates among them on the need 
of updating and modernising their historical knowledge pursuant to the western model, and of 
the necessity of importing modern western culture in general. But as time went on, it became
more and more clear to them that there was no better alternative. As Wei Yuan (1794–1856), a 
reform-minded historian in the late Qing dynasty, sagaciously put it: the best way to deal with the
“barbarians” was “to learn from the barbarians in order to rein them in” (shiyi zhiyi). Here the “bar-
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barians” referred to the Europeans who were then pressing on the Qing borders and threatening 
its sovereignty. Pejorative as it was, the term reflected the Sinocentric way of thinking prevalent 
among the Chinese literati at the time. But on another look, by forcing open China’s door, what
the Europeans did there as well as elsewhere could hardly be called a civilised mission either, 
even if many of them did believe that they were spreading “civilisation” to the world. All the same,
the end result was that having imported nationalism, China, India and other countries outside 
Europe freed themselves from the yoke of European domination and gained political independ-
ence one after another, which effectively put an end to the era of colonialism and ushered in the 
age of postcolonialism.17 To be sure, political independence does not necessarily lead to cultur-
al independence, which is a powerful argument put forth by postcolonial scholars. Postcolonial 
study has aptly revealed and called due attention to the fact that, although colonialism has by and 
large come to an end, its influence has been both pervasive and persistent. (In writing this pa-
per, I have chosen to use the example of China, which was never formally colonised by western 
powers, to discuss the relevance of postcolonialism exactly because I want to demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of the far-reaching influence of European colonialism in the world.) But it seems 
atavistic and has certainly gone too far for some postcolonial scholars to argue the need for dis-
owning the nationalist heritage in order to cleanse the residual influence of colonialism. Indeed, 
though an import, nationalism has become an integral part of the cultural legacy for many coun-
tries in the world, western and nonwestern alike. Likewise, it could not be so wise and tactful to 
call for the disuse of history and the death of the historical discipline simply because the genre 
of national history, undoubtedly an overarching form in modern historiography, failed in its part 
to portray the diverse traditions in a given country. Nor should nonwestern peoples reject and 
renounce history, or “History” with a linear view and truncated characterisation of the past, sim-
ply because it was something from the West.18 It is one thing to depict and denounce the distor-
tion of a cultural past by nationalist historians; it is quite another to reject the need for historical 
study and relinquish historiography as an important way of remembering the past. The latter is 
not only atavistic, but also, as Dipesh Chakrabarty observes astutely, unrealistic.19
What is more problematic, as this author tries to show, is that those attempts mentioned above 
are inconsistent with and even contrary to the original goal introduced by postcolonial scholars, 
namely those in the Subaltern Studies collective, in the first place. The collective’s initial effort 
was to give a proper and legitimate voice to the subaltern classes or groups, which is laudable 
and still much needed, for it could effectively expose the limits of nationalist historiography and 
open our eyes to various forms of historical consciousness and manifestation. Yet this search
for alternative history, or alternative ways of writing and representing history, seems to have 
been overshadowed by the project of revealing the deficiency and flaws in the practice of nation-
alist historiography.20 Meaningful as it is, the project of criticising nationalist history has gener-
ated a great amount of interest among postcolonial scholars, as shown in the popularity of Homi 
Bhabha’s works. But it has also diverted attention from the collective’s initial focus on study-
ing the subaltern. This shift of interest has been evidenced in the writings of some postcolonial 
scholars, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, who started as a social historian only to focus in more 
recent years on examining critically the legacy of European modernity in the world.21 Some oth-
ers have decided to leave the collective. A notable example is Sumit Sarkar who, thanks to his 
continuous and excellent research on social history, has become one of the best historians of
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 03:01:07 |
90
The Power of Paradox
India in our times. It is not my intention to criticise, much less to chastise, the moves taken by 
these postcolonial scholars, for what they have accomplished has a value and importance in its 
own right. By expounding the idea of “hybridity”, Homi Bhabha, for instance, writes beautifully and
characterises vividly the ways in which nonwestern nationalists and intellectuals absorbed and 
appropriated the influence of nationalism, revealing and portraying a common syncretism that 
had animated and driven the nationalist projects in many parts of the world.22 (By drawing atten-
tion to the alliance between communism and nationalism in modern China, this article tries to 
explore a similar point.) But the irony is, the more we spend time on examining the persistence 
of western cultural dominance and hegemony (regardless of how critical our position may be),
the further we are away from the valuable task set for us originally by the Subaltern Studies to 
find an effective way of depicting and defending the interest of the subaltern. The development
of postcolonial study thus has run a circular course of development. It started as an attempt to 
challenge and deplete western cultural hegemony, only to have generated more interest in it,
adding more longevity than it perhaps deserves.
By way of concluding, I would like to add that it would be more meaningful and consequential for 
postcolonial scholars to focus on denouncing the genre of national history-writing and disown-
ing history if we were indeed living in a postnationalist world in which nationalist historiography
and the idea of nationalism have been rendered extraneous. But many recent developments in 
today’s world seem to have pointed to the contrary. Not only has nationalism as a powerful po-
litical and intellectual force continued to exert its influence in many parts of the world, actually
more so in developing countries than in the developed ones, but even in the latter where cri-
tiques of nationalism have gained major ground among the academes in recent decades – the 
rise of global history has amounted to an effort to look for an alternative to nationalist historiog-
raphy – it is also quite visible in the government policies and the behaviours of the peoples.23 In 
today’s Europe, the increase in xenophobic attitudes and actions towards immigrants from Asia 
and Africa is a case in point. In the US, much of the policy made by the Bush administration and 
supported at the time by the public after the September 11 attacks has also been unmistakably
nationalistic, tinged with an imperialist interest. Clearly, if nationalism remains a vital force in 
shaping today’s world – in today’s China, it has been a major driving force in the country’s ex-
plosive economic growth in recent years – it suggests that national history-writing will not be 
done away with easily, nor can it be readily relegated to the status of something belonging to
the bygone era of colonialism. In fact, since the history curriculum in many countries is designed
nationalistically (again, more so in developing than in the developed countries), the idea of na-
tional history remains the most important form in organising and presenting our knowledge of 
the past. Having said that, I do not mean to disparage the importance of postcolonial scholars 
engaging critically with the practice of national history, nor to discredit the significance of their 
effort to search for an alternative to the European notion of history. But the criticism of national-
ist historiography should not blind us to the relevance and even vitality of national history, just
as the search for new ways of studying history should not lead to the conclusion that the only 
alternative to historical writing is no-history.
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